Skip to main content
Looking over the development of the Shwe Kokko ‘new city’ from the Thai side of the border, across Moei River, July 2022. Source: Author.

Militia as a Coercive Broker: Border Guard Forces and Crime Cities in Myanmar’s Karen Borderland

Militia as a Coercive Broker: Border Guard Forces and Crime Cities in Myanmar’s Karen Borderland

|

Proliferation of online scam operations along the Myanmar–Thailand border started to attract the attention of international media in the early 2020s. Globalised Sinophone organised crime groups were running scam compounds in Myawaddy, Karen State—a key hub for border trade between the two countries—under the protection of various local armed groups. Most notable among these organisations was the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF)—one of the militias that, at least formally, fell under the command of the Myanmar military (Frontier Myanmar 2022; Clapp and Tower 2022b). These operations were in Shwe Kokko village, in the Yatai New City zone that was already notorious for hosting online gambling and scam groups since 2019, but also in many other scam compounds in and around Myawaddy, including Dongmei Park, KK Park, and Huanya City (Cheng 2022; Faulder 2020; Frontier Myanmar 2023; Justice for Myanmar 2024; Saw Bothol and Souphatta 2023). These compounds were staffed by potentially tens of thousands of workers from China, Southeast and South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, many of whom were trafficked and enslaved (OHCHR 2023: 7). 

As noted by Franceschini et al. (2023), these online scam compounds emerged in Southeast Asia—especially in Cambodia, the Philippines, and Myanmar—in the late 2010s, due to a convergence of interests between local elites and transnational organised crime groups. Nevertheless, the interests of local elites in Myanmar, the latest hotspot, have not yet been thoroughly analysed. Indeed, while the Karen BGF has often been termed an ‘ally’ or ‘proxy’ of the Myanmar military against the Karen National Union (KNU), a major Karen insurgent group, its ambiguous character intermediating between the state, rebels, and civilians has not been fully elaborated (Clapp and Tower 2022a; KIC 2024a; Wolf 2024). In January 2024, the Karen BGF changed its name to the Karen National Army (KNA), but it is still widely referred to as the BGF.

The concept of ‘coercive brokerage’ helps us understand the behaviour of the Karen BGF and other armed actors operating in the liminal space between states and anti-state groups. States without a monopoly on violence deploy and use violence through various irregular forces—such as militias, paramilitaries, warlords, mafias, bandits, and strongmen—to expand control in peripheral areas (Almond 2021; Blok 1974; Gallant 1999; Gutiérrez Sanín 2019; Marten 2012; Migdal 2001; Volkov 2002). These intermediary actors, so-called coercive brokers, arbitrate across boundaries between states and societies, between the centre and the periphery, and between the legal and the illegal (Almond 2021; Goodhand et al. 2024; Meehan and Goodhand 2023; Pope 2023). They are tied to the states by strongly ambivalent relations: on the one hand, they disregard state law; on the other, they act in connivance with state authority and, through covert and pragmatic relationships with state agents, solidify their own local control (Blok 1974: 6).

This essay aims to reveal local power dynamics surrounding the flourishing of crime cities along the Myanmar–Thailand border since the late 2010s. I inquire into what local factors enabled the proliferation of transnational organised crime in Myanmar’s Karen borderland in this period. I argue that coercive brokerage by the Karen BGF leadership, mediating and networking across social divisions between the Myanmar military, the KNU, and civilians, provided a perfect environment for transnational Chinese criminal groups to expand their activities in the area.

This essay is based on one year of fieldwork in the Myanmar–Thailand border area in 2021–22. Most of the interviewees are anonymised due to security risks, with * indicating a pseudonym and #X referring to an interviewee number (see the list at the end of the essay). After providing a brief background, I demonstrate how, in the 2010s, the Karen BGF enhanced its bargaining power against other actors in the Karen borderland through coercive brokerage. I also elaborate on how the Myanmar military’s coup in 2021 and its aftermath fortified the BGF’s position and contributed to the further expansion of illicit economies. 

Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)

The Karen BGF derives from the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), which was established in 1995 by Buddhist soldiers who, inspired by a Karen Buddhist monk named U Thuzana, broke away from the KNU and reached a ceasefire with Myanmar’s military regime. In exchange for the ceasefire and for supporting the military’s offensive against the KNU, the DKBA’s leaders were offered concessions by the military to run various highly profitable businesses (Chambers 2019: 266). Rank-and-file members engaged in taxation, logging, mining, trading, and, allegedly, drug trafficking (Gravers 2020; Thawnghmung 2008: 35). As the DKBA sided with the Myanmar military, its human rights abuses against civilians and often murky commercial activities largely shaped its public image as a ‘proxy militia’, a ‘betrayer’ of the Karen cause, or a predatory and profit-seeking violent enterprise (HRW 2007; KHRG 2006; South 2008: 58, 2011: 19; Thawnghmung 2008: 34).

However, reassessment of its civilian engagement reveals the DKBA’s ambiguous identity. U Thuzana’s vision of ‘a Karen space of peace and tranquillity’ attracted followers among both Karen Buddhist villagers and soldiers, the latter of whom resented the Christian-dominated KNU leadership, which was one of the triggers of the split (Gravers 2006: 247–48; Keenan 2013: 183). In some areas, U Thuzana and the DKBA also protected civilians from the Myanmar military’s abuses while providing them with public goods, such as schools, clinics, roads, and bridges (Gravers 2015: 59, 61; 2020). Through this, the DKBA may have earned some popularity among civilians. Multiple sources (#02 and #03) testify that the DKBA was seen, at least at its inception, as working for the Karen ethnic cause. 

Nevertheless, the DKBA’s popularity did not last long as a sense of inequality, corruption, and lack of discipline came to permeate the organisation. While a small number of high-ranking officials lived a relatively comfortable life, rank-and-file soldiers were often experiencing shortages of food and arms supplies (Keenan n.d.: 157). Some disillusioned soldiers deserted and returned to the KNU or to their home villages, while many new recruits were attracted only by the prospects of power and economic opportunities (Sherman 2003: 235; Thawnghmung 2008: 19). Ordinary Karen people increasingly viewed the DKBA merely as part of the Myanmar military, seeing it as pursuing its own economic interests in a departure from U Thuzana’s intentions (#02).

Transformation into the Karen BGF: Becoming a Coercive Broker

In 2010, most DKBA members, alongside many other groups who had agreed to ceasefires, were incorporated under the Myanmar military’s command as the Border Guard Force. Due to the military’s membership regulations regarding age, criminal record, and physical conditions, approximately 2,000 soldiers were forced to retire while those who fit the criteria were transformed into 13 Karen BGF battalions, each with 326 soldiers (EBO 2011: 1–2). The BGFs were responsible for assisting the Myanmar military by gathering intelligence, guiding them in difficult terrain, and supporting them in fighting against ethnic armed organisations (Buchanan 2016: 24).

However, various reports and my own research suggest that, despite this official subordinate status, the Karen BGF largely maintained its agency and autonomy, retaining its own revenue sources, membership, and equipment beyond the military’s control. Many Karen BGF commanders raised revenue by engaging in a range of licit, semi-licit, and illicit economic activities, including rubber and palm plantations, mining, tourism, construction, trading, gambling, and, potentially, drug trafficking (Htun Htun 2021; Sasaki 2021: 95). Trading across the Myanmar–Thailand border, as was the case for the KNU before the 1980s, was an important revenue source. 

Transportation of secondhand cars from Thailand (foreground) to Myanmar (background) across the Moei River beside the Star Complex, one of the casinos in Myawaddy. November 2021. Source: Author. 

However, in the 2010s, the importance of the border trade was soon replaced with the more lucrative gambling industry. BGF leaders set up dozens of casinos in partnership with initially Thai businessmen and, later, Chinese investors (KIC 2020). One of the largest among them was Yatai New City in Shwe Kokko, launched by companies run by She Zhijiang, a Chinese businessman with a Cambodian passport, and Saw Min Min Oo, a former personal assistant to Colonel Saw Chit Thu, who had become the most influential figure in the Karen BGF as the group’s Secretary-General (Cheng 2022; Naw Betty Han 2019b; Thiha 2018; Tower and Clapp 2020: 9). She Zhijiang and his investors were a group of overseas Chinese, Chinese citizens, and criminal gangs who had relocated from Cambodia and other countries in Southeast Asia after crackdowns on their illegal gambling operations (Tower and Clapp 2020: 3). Their partnership with Karen BGF leaders provided an ideal space for them to conduct illicit activities beyond the rules and restrictions of the Myanmar national authorities and any other governments (Tower and Clapp 2020: 4). BGF members have also allegedly benefited from drug trafficking (KHRG 2012, 2015, 2018). The BGF’s increasing involvement in illicit economies was enabled by the organisation’s collusion with the Myanmar military, which looked the other way and potentially benefited from it (Naw Betty Han 2019a).

Looking over the development of the Shwe Kokko ‘new city’ from the Thai side of the border, across Moei River, July 2022. Source: Author.
She Zhijiang (centre-left in suit) and Saw Chit Thu (right in green uniform) at the Karen BGF’s ninth anniversary ceremony, August 2019. Source: Frontier Myanmar (2021).

Accumulation of wealth enabled some BGF battalion commanders to strengthen their military might by directly importing arms and ammunition from overseas without the Myanmar military’s oversight (#08). Their heightened military power became their leverage against the military. Following the civilian government’s investigation into the Yatai Project, the military finally scrutinised the case and, as a result, pressured the three BGF leaders responsible for the project, including Colonel Saw Chit Thu, to step down in early 2020. The leaders reluctantly agreed to resign, but thousands of soldiers in the force vowed to also leave if they went ahead. Spooked by that, the military urged the BGF leaders to reconsider (Naw Betty Han et al. 2021). Ultimately, none of the BGF leaders resigned, and construction at Shwe Kokko restarted immediately after the military coup in February 2021 (ICG 2022: 19).

Although the BGF leaders primarily enriched themselves, their affluence also enabled them to enhance their patronage over subordinates and civilians. According to informants close to the Myanmar military (#05 and #08), the BGF, after the transformation from the DKBA in 2010, maintained many of the former DKBA’s members as ‘reserves’ regardless of their eligibility as BGF soldiers as designated by the military. Furthermore, the BGF commanders recruited additional unofficial members to support their commercial activities—for example, to work as security guards for the casinos. These unofficial members were financially supported by high-ranked officers although they were ineligible for wages, rations, and other benefits provided by the military (Htun Htun 2021). The presence of these unofficial members increased the BGF’s manpower up to approximately 8,000 by 2020, though the number of BGF members was officially limited to 4,238 (326 members multiplied by 13 battalions) (Nyein Nyein 2021). Unofficial and personal recruitment nurtured allegiance to the individual commanders who recruited them, rather than the organisation (#05). 

The wealth also enabled BGF leaders to make financial contributions to service delivery and religious and cultural activities (Chambers 2019). It seems the group’s service provision benefited civilians, especially in the health sector. My research reveals that the BGF’s health department has been running the Sitagu Chit Thu General Hospital in Shwe Kokko and four clinics in surrounding areas (#04). However, some interviewees’ accounts indicate civilians’ mixed responses to the BGF’s civilian outreach. Joshua* (#10), a foreign social business entrepreneur who had visited a village with a strong BGF presence in Hlaingbwe Township of Karen State many times, emphasised the organisation’s immersion in the local community and civilian acceptance: ‘The BGF is influential in the village. Many BGF leaders live in the village just like ordinary villagers. BGF leaders in Hlaingbwe and Myaing Gyi Ngu areas have lived in village communities since the time of the DKBA.’

However, Khin* (#14), a worker in a community-based organisation who spent part of her childhood in Shwe Kokko, pointed out the BGF’s unresponsiveness to the residents’ concerns about the detrimental impact of the construction of the ‘New City’: 

Local Karen people have not been satisfied with the changing situations … Many local Karen residents had to give up their land for the project with insufficient compensation. Some of those who did not have to give up their land encountered problems such as their houses being damaged by the large-scale construction … In the beginning, they complained to the BGF authority, but they were mostly not listened to.

Despite this, it appears that some civilians still perceived the BGF as a relatively benign actor compared with the Myanmar military. In the words of Aye Aye Mar* (#13), a teacher from a village near Shwe Kokko: ‘Many villages had serious fear against the Myanmar military because of their experience in the past … But people are not scared of … the BGF.’ Similarly, Joshua* (#10), referring to the situation in Hlaingbwe, explained: ‘The BGF’s presence has been a part of villagers’ lives for a long time. I have not observed fear among villagers … Though it may seem contradictory, they see the Myanmar military and the BGF as different.’

Furthermore, the Karen BGF enhanced its leverage against the KNU after the latter reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military in 2012. Despite its status as a militia, the BGF joined the Unity Committee for Karen Armed Groups (UCKAG), a coordination body for Karen armed groups (KNU n.a.). The intergroup engagement also extended to service delivery, policing, and taxation (Karen News 2015; KIC 2020; Nay Naw 2020a, 2020b, 2020c; Saw Myat Oo Thar 2020). Saw Chit Thu elaborated on the group’s ambiguous position between the Myanmar military and the KNU in a public speech in 2019:

The BGF is compelled to keep armed only to protect our state [Karen State] and our race [the Karen people] … We betrayed our mother organisation, the Karen National Union. However, we will not betray our state [the state of Myanmar] and the Karen State. (KIC 2019)

But what motivated the KNU to collaborate with the BGF? In the southern Karen area where the BGF has its stronghold, especially in the Karen National Liberation Army’s Seventh Brigade zone where Shwe Kokko is located, the KNU had much less access to economic rents or revenue sources than the BGF (ICG 2020: 29). Its military activities were also highly restricted. These constraints compelled some KNU leaders to coordinate with the BGF for its economic and military activities. As several informants (#07, #09, #11, #12) pointed out, the close relations between the BGF leaders and these KNU leaders were also supported by their personal ties as former KNU comrades before the split. Hein Zaw* (#09), a businessman who has had close ties with Saw Chit Thu for decades, explained that the leaders of the KNU and the BGF have developed ‘systematic coordination’ to maintain stability.

Post–2021 Coup: Fish in Troubled Waters

After the coup in February 2021, the Karen BGF was like a fish in troubled waters. The Myanmar military, encountering an increasing number of enemies, had no choice but to rely on the BGF’s armed power while tolerating its illicit businesses. Immediately after the coup, the BGF was allowed to resume construction in Shwe Kokko and reopen the casinos, although their core activities moved online (ICG 2022: 19). Alongside the gambling, even more lucrative online scam operations proliferated in at least 15 locations in Myawaddy by March 2022 (Clapp and Tower 2022a) and, by 2024, there were many more. These criminal enclaves flourishing along the Thai border were largely immune from rising insecurity in the Karen borderland. Shwe Kokko and other ‘new cities’ were ‘bullet-proof and bomb-proof’ no matter how much fighting took place in surrounding areas (The Irrawaddy 2023). 

Satellite imagery shows the development of KK Park. Source: Google Earth, 20 February 2024.

With rising regional concern and Chinese pressure, it was the Thai authorities who eventually acted. In August 2022, the Thai police arrested She Zhijiang, the kingpin of the Shwe Kokko project (Clapp and Tower 2022b). Power and telecommunication lines were cut in June 2023 (Saksornchai 2023). Nevertheless, casino and scam operations have continued unabated as, reportedly, cross-border electricity and telecommunication supplies were resumed covertly (Saw Say Gay and Ashen Fen 2024).

Possibly rattled by the offensive launched by armed groups on the Chinese border in October 2023, which ended up wiping out the Kokang BGF and the online scam operations that it ran in the region, the Karen BGF announced its breakaway from the Myanmar military and proclaimed ‘neutrality’ in January 2024, rebranding itself as the KNA (Aung Naing 2024; Naw Betty Han 2024a; RFA Burmese 2024a). The army generals in Naypyitaw, with reduced bargaining power, could no longer stop the departure of the BGF. 

This was followed in early April by the temporary takeover by the KNU and People’s Defence Force of Myawaddy Town, the border trade hub that had been under the government’s continuous control since independence, which appeared to be a significant shift in the balance of power in the Karen borderland. However, those patrolling the town after the takeover were not the KNU, but BGF/KNA soldiers. A few days later, the Myanmar military returned to the town, facilitated by the BGF/KNA (ICG 2024: 8–9). 

Despite its rebranding, the BGF/KNA maintained its limited cooperation with the Myanmar military. It appears that the group worked with the military to facilitate the deportation of 800 Chinese nationals involved in online scam operations in Shwe Kokko in March (RFA Burmese 2024b). The BGF units also still provided protection for Myanmar New Year events held by the military regime in Hpa’an, the capital of Karen State, under the military’s control (KIC 2024c). There is little sign that the Karen BGF’s brokerage-reliant survival mechanism has changed after the latest political shift. A media comment by a BGF official demonstrates the group’s unchanged ambiguity: ‘Even when we were the BGF, they did not fully trust us. We did not trust them either. Things are still like this’ (Major Saw Tin Win, in KIC 2024c). Although the BGF in May 2024 ordered ‘all foreigners doing online business around … Myawaddy Township’ to leave within six months, the impact of this order on the ground is not yet known. Meanwhile, it appears this encouraged many of these businesses to migrate to Three Pagodas Pass, another border town south of Myawaddy (Naw Betty Han 2024b; Saw Lwin 2024). 

Conclusion

This essay sought to reveal local power dynamics surrounding the proliferation of organised crime in the Myanmar–Thailand border area since the late 2010s. It demonstrated how the Karen BGF maintained its agency and autonomy despite its official status as a militia and even managed to enhance its bargaining power with the Myanmar military, KNU, and civilians by acting as a broker between them using its political, economic, and military power in the Karen borderland. I argued that the coercive brokerage of the Karen BGF leaders across the social divisions offered a favourable environment for proliferation of transnational crime. It also assessed how these crime cities survived after the 2021 coup, shielded from the changing political landscape, insecurity, and other regional pressures.

Interviews

#01: A journalist from Karen State, interviewed in Mae Sot, Thailand, 21 July 2022. 

#02: Director of a community-based health organisation based in Mae Sot, Thailand, interviewed in Mae Sot, 4 November 2021. 

#03: An official of a human rights advocacy group, interviewed in Mae Sot, Thailand, 9 November 2021. 

#04: An official of an ethnic health organisation affiliated with one of the non-KNU Karen armed groups, interviewed in Thailand, 11 February 2023. 

#05: A businessman based in Hpa’an Township, Karen State, formerly an official in the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence, interviewed online, 24 February and 13 June 2022. 

#06: A former staffer of an international nongovernmental organisation, interviewed in Mae Sot, Thailand, 31 May 2022. 

#07: A KNU official based in Mae Sot, Thailand, interviewed in Chiang Mai, Thailand, 2 August 2022. 

#08: Dr Naing Swe Oo, Director, Thay Nin Ga Institute for Strategic Studies, based in Yangon, interviewed online, 2 June 2022. 

#09: Hein Zaw*, overseas-based Myanmar businessman, interviewed online, 8 June 2022. 

#10: Joshua*, a foreign social business entrepreneur based in northern Myanmar, interviewed online, 18 June 2022. 

#11: Padoh Saw Taw Nee, head of the KNU Foreign Affairs Department, interviewed in Mae Sot, Thailand, 10 August 2022. 

#12: A former official in the president’s office and former captain in the Myanmar military, interviewed in Yangon, 30 June 2022. 

#13: Aye Aye Mar*, a teacher at a migrant school in Mae Sot, Thailand, from Myawaddy Township, Karen State, interviewed in Mae Sot, 25 November 2021. 

#14: Khin*, a staffer in a community organisation based in Mae Sot, Thailand, who spent part of her childhood in Shwe Kokko, Myawaddy Township, Karen State, interviewed in Mae Sot, 16 February 2022.

References

References

Almond, Niall. 2021. ‘Militias, Drugs and Borderland Governance.’ Drugs & (Dis)order, 9 August. London: Global Challenges Research Fund. drugs-disorder.soas.ac.uk/militias-drugs-and-borderland-governance.

Aung Naing. 2024. ‘Karen BGF to Rename Itself “Karen National Army”.’ Myanmar Now, 6 March. myanmar-now.org/en/news/karen-bgf-to-rename-itself-karen-national-army.

Blok, Anton. 1974. The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860–1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Buchanan, John. 2016. Militias in Myanmar. Washington, DC: Asia Foundation. asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Militias-in-Myanmar.pdf.

Chambers, Justine. 2019. ‘Towards a Moral Understanding of Karen State’s Paradoxical Buddhist Strongmen.’ Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 34(2): 258–89.

Cheng, Plato. 2022. ‘Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone/Yatai New City.’ The People’s Map of Global China, 18 August. thepeoplesmap.net/project/shwe-kokko-special-economic-zone-yatai-new-city.

Clapp, Priscilla A., and Jason Tower. 2022a. The Myanmar Army’s Criminal Alliance. Analysis, 7 March. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. www.usip.org/publications/2022/03/myanmar-armys-criminal-alliance.

Clapp, Priscilla A., and Jason Tower. 2022b. Myanmar’s Criminal Zones: A Growing Threat to Global Security. Analysis, 9 November. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/myanmars-criminal-zones-growing-threat-global-security.

Euro-Burma Office (EBO). 2011. The Situation in Karen State after the Elections. Analysis Paper No. 1/2011. Brussels: EBO.

Faulder, Dominic. 2022. ‘Asia’s Scamdemic: How COVID-19 Supercharged Online Crime.’ Nikkei Asia, [Tokyo], 15 November. asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Asia-s-scamdemic-How-COVID-19-supercharged-online-crime.

Franceschini, Ivan, Ling Li, and Mark Bo. 2023. ‘Compound Capitalism: A Political Economy of Southeast Asia’s Online Scam Operations.’ Critical Asian Studies 55(4): 575–603.

Frontier Myanmar. 2021. ‘With Conflict Escalating, Karen BGF Gets Back to Business.’ Frontier Myanmar, 13 May. www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/with-conflict-escalating-karen-bgf-gets-back-to-business.

Frontier Myanmar. 2022. ‘Scam City: How the Coup Brought Shwe Kokko Back to Life.’ Frontier Myanmar, 23 June. www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/scam-city-how-the-coup-brought-shwe-kokko-back-to-life.

Frontier Myanmar. 2023. ‘Controversial Border Project Looms Over KNU Congress.’ Frontier Myanmar, 3 May. www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/controversial-border-project-looms-over-knu-congress.

Gallant, Thomas. 1999. ‘Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State-Formation: Transnational Crime from a Historical World-Systems Perspective.’ In States and Illegal Practices, edited by Josiah McC. Heyman, 25–61. Oxford, UK: Berg.

Goodhand, Jonathan, Patrick Meehan, Camilo Acero, and Jan Koehler. 2024. Coercive Brokerage: Paramilitaries, Illicit Economies and Organised Crime in the Frontiers of Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar—Working Paper II. SOCACE Research Paper No. 28. Birmingham, UK: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence Research Programme, University of Birmingham. www.socace-research.org.uk/publications/socace-rp28-coercive-brokerage-wp2-casestudies.

Gravers, Mikael. 2006. ‘Conversion and Identity: Religion and the Formation of Karen Identity in Burma.’ Exploring Ethnic Diversity in Burma, edited by Mikael Gravers, 227–58. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

Gravers, Mikael. 2015. ‘Religious Imaginary as an Alternative Social and Moral Order: Karen Buddhism Across the Thai-Burma Border.’ In Building Noah’s Ark for Migrants, Refugees, and Religious Communities, edited by Alexander Horstmann and Jin-Heon Jung, 45–76. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gravers, Mikael. 2020. ‘A Saint in Command? Spiritual Protection, Justice, and Religious Tensions in the Karen State.’ Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship 1(1): 87–119.

Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco. 2019. Clientelistic Warfare Paramilitaries and the State in Colombia (1982–2007). Oxford, UK: Peter Lang Ltd.

Htun Htun. 2021. ‘ကရင် BGF ခေါင်းဆောင်တွေ ဘယ်လမ်းရွေးမလဲ [Which Way Will the Karen BGF Leaders Choose?]’ The Irrawaddy (Burmese), [Chiang Mai, Thailand], 20 January. burma.irrawaddy.com/article/2021/01/20/236754.html.

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2007. ‘Burma: Army and Its Proxies Threaten Refugee Camps.’ News release, 14 April. New York, NY: HRW. reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/burma-army-and-its-proxies-threaten-refugee-camps.

International Crisis Group (ICG). 2020. Commerce and Conflict: Navigating Myanmar’s China Relationship. Asia Report No. 305, 30 March. Brussels: ICG. www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/305-commerce-and-conflict-navigating-myanmars-china-relationship.

International Crisis Group (ICG). 2022. Myanmar’s Coup Shakes Up Its Ethnic Conflicts. Asia Report No. 319, 12 January. Brussels: ICG. www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmars-coup-shakes-its-ethnic-conflicts.

International Crisis Group (ICG). 2024. Ethnic Autonomy and Its Consequences in Post-Coup Myanmar. Briefing No. 180, 30 May. Brussels: ICG. www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b180-ethnic-autonomy-and-its-consequences-post-coup-myanmar.

Justice for Myanmar. 2024. ‘The Karen Border Guard Force/Karen National Army Criminal Business Network Exposed.’ Justice for Myanmar website, 22 May. http://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/the-karen-border-guard-force-karen-national-army-criminal-business-network-exposed.

Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG). 2006. Oppression by Proxy in Thaton District. Report. KHRG. khrg.org/my/node/1031.

Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG). 2012. Abuses Since the DKBA and KNLA Ceasefires: Forced Labour and Arbitrary Detention in Dooplaya. Field Report, 7 May. KHRG. khrg.org/2012/05/khrg12f2/abuses-dkba-and-knla-ceasefires-forced-labour-and-arbitrary-detention-dooplaya.

Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG). 2015. Hpa-an Field Report: January to December 2013. Field Report, 19 January. KHRG. https://www.khrg.org/2015/01/14-5-f1/hpa-an-field-report-january-december-2013.

Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG). 2018. Hpapun Interview: Naw H—, December 2017. 18 June. KHRG. khrg.org/2018/06/17-133-a16-i1/hpapun-interview-naw-h-december-2017.

Karen Information Center (KIC). 2019. ‘အချင်းချင်း ပြန်လည်တိုက်ခိုက်ရန် ဆန္ဒမရှိ‌တော့‌ကြောင်း BGF ခေါင်း‌ဆောင် ဗိုလ်မှူးကြီး‌စောချစ်သူ‌ပြော [“No Desire to Fight Against Each Other Again,” BGF’s Leader Colonel Saw Chit Thu Says].’ News, 20 August. KIC. kicnews.org/2019/08/အခ်င္းခ်င္း-ျပန္လည္တုိက/.

Karen Information Center (KIC). 2020. ‘မြဝတီမြို့နယ်ထဲရှိ ကာစီနိုရုံ၊ ဂိမ်း‌လောင်းကစားဆိုင်များကို စစ်‌ဆေး အ‌ရေးယူမည် [Casino Houses and Game Shops to be Investigated in Myawaddy Township].’ News, 26 May. KIC. https://kicnews.org/2020/05/ျမဝတီၿမိဳ႕နယ္ထဲရွိ-ကာစီ.

Karen Information Center (KIC). 2024a. ‘Powerful BGF Leader Protecting Chinese Gangs at Shwe Kokko Declares Autonomous Zone in Myawaddy—Colonel Chit Thu also Ends Karen BGF’s Proxy Role Under the Junta.’ Burma News International, 26 January. www.bnionline.net/en/news/powerful-bgf-leader-protecting-chinese-gangs-shwe-kokko-declares-autonomous-zone-myawaddy.

Karen Information Center (KIC). 2024b. ‘BGF တပ်နယ်အားလုံး ကရင်အမျိုးသားတပ်မတော်-KNA အဖြစ် ပြောင်းလဲရပ်တည်မည် [All BGF Cantonments Will Become the Karen National Army (KNA)].’ News, 1 March. KIC. kicnews.org/2024/03/bgf-တပ်နယ်အားလုံး-ကရင်အမျိ.

Karen Information Center (KIC). 2024c. ‘စစ်ကောင်စီသင်္ကြန်ကို ကရင်နယ်ခြားစောင့်တပ်က လုံခြုံရေးနှင့် ဖျော်ဖြေရေးကဏ္ဍများတွင် ပါဝင်ကူညီနေ [Karen BGF Provided Security and Participated in Entertainment Stages in the Military Council’s Thingyan Festival].’ News, 16 April. KIC. kicnews.org/2024/04/စစ်ကောင်စီသင်္ကြန်ကို-က.

Karen National Union (KNU). n.a. ‘Unity Committee for Karen Armed Groups—UCKAG.’ KNU website. knuhq.org/en/unity/uckag.

Karen News. 2015. ‘Karen to Merge Tollgates on Myawaddy–Kawkareik Asia Highway After Complaints.’ Karen News, 8 June. karennews.org/2015/06/karen-to-merge-tollgates-on-myawaddy-kawkareik-asia-highway-after-complaints.

Keenan, Paul. n.d. A Just Country: The Karen of Burma: Nationalism and Conflict. Unpublished ms.

Keenan, Paul. 2013. By Force of Arms. New Delhi: VIJ Books.

Marten, Kimberly. 2012. Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Meehan, Patrick, and Jonathan Goodhand. 2023. Coercive Brokerage: The Paramilitary–Organized Crime Nexus in Borderlands and Frontiers. Working Paper I. SOCACE Research Paper No. 26. Birmingham, UK: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence Research Programme, University of Birmingham. www.socace-research.org.uk/publications/socace-rp26-coercive-brokerage-wp1.

Migdal, Joel S. 2001. State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Naw Betty Han. 2019a. ‘Shwe Kokko: A Paradise for Chinese Investment.’ Frontier Myanmar, 15 September. www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/shwe-kokko-a-paradise-for-chinese-investment.

Naw Betty Han. 2019b. ‘The Business of the Kayin State Border Guard Force.’ Frontier Myanmar, 19 December. www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/the-business-of-the-kayin-state-border-guard-force.

Naw Betty Han. 2024a. ‘“Business is Back”: BGF Adapts under Pressure.’ Frontier Myanmar, 8 April. www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/business-is-back-bgf-adapts-under-pressure.

Naw Betty Han. 2024b. ‘South for the Winter: Myanmar’s Cyber Scam Industry Migrates.’ Frontier Myanmar, 29 August. www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/south-for-the-winter-myanmars-cyber-scam-industry-migrates.

Naw Betty Han, and Thomas Kean. 2020. ‘In Myanmar, Chang Faces Its Own Black Market.’ Frontier Myanmar, 18 January. www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/in-myanmar-chang-faces-its-own-black-market.

Naw Betty Han, Thomas Kean, and Lawin Weng. 2021. ‘Will the Kayin BGF Go Quietly?’ Frontier Myanmar, 26 January. www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/will-the-kayin-bgf-go-quietly.

Nay Naw. 2020a. ‘မော်‌တော်ယာဉ်၌ တပ်ဆင်ထားသည့် လက်နက်ကိုင်တပ်ဖွဲ့ အမှတ်အသားစ‌တေကာနှင့် နံပါတ်ပြားများ ဖြုတ်သိမ်းမှု ပြုလုပ် [Armed Groups’ Stickers and Number Plates Removed from Cars].’ News, 21 May. KIC. kicnews.org/2020/05/ေမာ္ေတာ္ယာဥ္၌-တပ္ဆင္ထား.

Nay Naw. 2020b. ‘လောင်းကစားရုံဖွင့်ရန် ဆောင်ရွက်‌နေသည့် တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသား ၃ ဦးအား လောင်းကစားစက် ၁ဝလုံးနှင့် အတူဖမ်းဆီး [Three Chinese Nationals Arrested for Preparing to Open a Casino with Ten Gambling Machines Confiscated].’ News, 17 June. KIC. kicnews.org/2020/06/ေလာင္းကစားရံုဖြင့္ရန္-ေ.

Nay Naw. 2020c. ‘မြဝတီမြို့တွင် နိုင်ငံခြားသားများ တရားမဝင် သွားလာမှုရှိမရှိ စစ်‌ဆေးမှုများပြုလုပ် [Patrol Undertaken to Check Illegal Migration of Foreigners in Myawaddy Town].’ News, 5 August. KIC. kicnews.org/2020/08/ျမဝတီၿမိဳ႕တြင္-ႏုိင္ငံျ.

Nyein Nyein. 2021. ‘Leadership Quits en Masse After Military Ousts Its Chief.’ The Irrawaddy, [Chiang Mai, Thailand], 15 January. www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/karen-state-militia-leadership-quits-en-masse-military-ousts-chief.html.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 2023. Online Scam Operations and Trafficking into Forced Criminality in Southeast Asia: Recommendations for a Human Rights Response. Bangkok: OHCHR. bangkok.ohchr.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/ONLINE-SCAM-OPERATIONS-2582023.pdf.

Pope, Nicholas. 2023. ‘Militias Going Rogue: Social Dilemmas and Coercive Brokerage in Rio de Janeiro’s Urban Frontier.’ Journal of International Development 35(3): 478–90.

RFA Burmese. 2024a. ‘Kayin Border Guard Force Cuts Ties with Myanmar Junta.’ Radio Free Asia, 25 January. www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/border-guard-force-01252024154123.html.

RFA Burmese. 2024b. ‘တိုက်ပွဲပြင်းထန်နေတဲ့ မြဝတီမှာ အွန်လိုင်းငွေလိမ်ဂိုဏ်းတွေ ပုံမှန်လည်ပတ်နေဆဲ [Online Scam Groups Are Operating Normally in Myawaddy Where the Fighting is Fierce].’ RFA Burmese, 12 April. www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/online-fruad-myawaddy-04122024063520.html.

Saksornchai, Jintamas. 2023. ‘Thailand Cuts Power to Myanmar Border Towns’ Notorious Casinos, but They Keep Operating.’ Associated Press, 6 June. apnews.com/article/thailand-myanmar-electricity-cut-casino-crime-9d773f9f71721936e85da6dd4ac97822.

Sanders, Lewis IV, Julia Bayer, Julett Pineda, and Yuchen Li. 2024. ‘How Chinese Mafia Run a Scam Factory in Myanmar.’ DW, 30 January. www.dw.com/en/how-chinese-mafia-run-a-scam-factory-in-myanmar/a-68113480.

Sasaki, Ken. 2021. ‘ミャンマー・カイン州の武装勢力による現行和平プロセスへの反応 [The Response to the Current Peace Process by Armed Groups in Kayin State, Myanmar].’ 東洋文化研究所紀要 [Memoirs of Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia] 179: 77–103.

Saw Bothol, and Souphatta. 2023. ‘Thousands of Trafficked People Held at Scam Casino Site Amid Escalating Violence.’ Radio Free Asia, 25 April. www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/trafficking-04252023100423.html.

Saw Lwin. 2024. ‘Myanmar Junta–Linked Armed Group Orders Foreign Scammers Out of Myawaddy.’ The Irrawaddy, [Chiang Mai, Thailand], 7 May. www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-linked-armed-group-orders-foreign-scammers-out-of-myawaddy.html.

Saw Myat Oo Thar. 2020. ‘ကြာအင်းဆိပ်ကြီးမြို့နယ်တွင် ဘိန်းစာပင် ၂,ဝဝဝ ကျော်ကို ပူး‌ပေါင်းအဖွဲ့ ရှင်းလင်း [More Than 2,000 Trees of Kratom Cleared by the Joint Force in Kyainseikkyi Township].’ News, 23 May. KIC. kicnews.org/2020/05/ၾကာအင္းဆိပ္ႀကီးၿမိဳ႕န-32.

Saw Say Gay, and George Ashen Fen. 2024. ‘What’s at Stake as the Kayin BGF Seeks Independence?’ Frontier Myanmar, 29 January. www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/whats-at-stake-as-the-kayin-bgf-seeks-independence.

Sherman, Jake. 2003. ‘Burma: Lessons from the Cease-Fires.’ In The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, edited by Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, 225–55. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

South, Ashley. 2008. Ethnic Politics in Burma. London: Routledge.

South, Ashley. 2011. Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

Thawnghmung, Ardeth Maung. 2008. The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.

The Irrawaddy. 2023. ‘ရာဇဝတ်ကွန်ရက် KK-Park တွင် KNU ခေါင်းဆောင်များ ပါဝင်ပတ်သက်နေ [KNU Leaders Involved in Criminal Network’s KK Park].’ The Irrawaddy, [Chiang Mai, Thailand], 27 November. burma.irrawaddy.com/article/2023/11/27/376817.html.

Thiha. 2018. ‘New City Project by Chinese Firm Raises Hackles in Kayin.’ Myanmar Times, 20 September. www.consult-myanmar.com/2018/09/20/new-city-project-by-chinese-firm-raises-hackles-in-kayin.

Tower, Jason, and Pricilla Clapp. 2020. Myanmar’s Casino Cities: The Role of China and Transnational Criminal Networks. Special Report, 27 July. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. www.usip.org/publications/2020/07/myanmars-casino-cities-role-china-and-transnational-criminal-networks.

Volkov, Vadim. 2002. Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Wolf, Jessy. 2024. ‘Notorious Military-Allied Border Guard Force Appears to Distance Itself from Junta.’ Myanmar Now, 23 January. myanmar-now.org/en/news/notorious-military-allied-border-guard-force-appears-to-distance-itself-from-junta.


Kota Watanabe is a PhD candidate in the Department of Development Studies, SOAS University London, studying contested state-building in Myanmar’s Karenland through the lens of social order. His research interests include state–society relations, conflict, development, and humanitarian assistance. He has a decade of experience as a Japanese diplomat specialising in Myanmar and is fluent in Burmese.
SOAS University London

Subscribe!

Subscribe here to receive the monthly newsletter of the Global China Lab, in which we will share updates about our projects and new content published across all our platforms (the Made in China Journal, The People’s Map of Global China, and Global China Pulse).